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THE
NEW-CHURCH REVIEW

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THE PRINCIPLES OF NEW-CHURCH ORGANIZATION.*

BY HENRY G. DE GEYMULLER.

PROFOUNDLY convinced of the divinity and of the perfection of the New Revelation [from the Lord that has been imparted to humanity through the instrumentality of Emanuel Swedenborg], I have been painfully impressed by the imperfections of the Church founded upon that Revelation, and especially by the fact that the weaknesses and defects of human nature manifest themselves therein as though reflected in a mirror. . . . I am therefore taking upon myself to share with you the results of my meditations on this subject continued through many years with absolute disinterestedness. What gives me hope of being understood by you is the fact that I know that you, too, are equally disinterested and as passionately attached to the well-being and progress of the Church. It

*An address delivered at Brussels before the Eleventh Synod of the French New-Church Federation. Owing to limitations of space the Editors have found it necessary to abridge the introductory third of this essay greatly; but the rest is here given almost entire. The translation from the French, for which we are indebted to Mr. Hugh M. Hite, has been carefully revised by the Editors.

suffices me, then, to make an appeal to your love for the sacred cause which we all seek to defend to the extent of our abilities. You must quickly assure yourselves that I am not seeking to impose on you my personal ideas and particular preferences. It is not on the plane of our personal likes and dislikes that the consideration must take place. It is not a question of knowing whether a solution pleases or displeases, but of knowing whether it is in itself good or bad, right or wrong. . . .

The present ineffectiveness of our Church is due to two causes which it is perfectly possible for us to grasp, to define, and finally to eliminate. These two causes, which react upon and re-enforce each other, are confusion of mind on the one hand and defects in the organization of the Church on the other. False ideas are like evil fruits which bring forth evil trees, which again bring forth evil fruits. And the institutions which characterize the present organization of our Church did not descend from heaven, nor were they derived from the Writings of Swedenborg. On the contrary, those Writings make allusions to a type of organization very different from that which in most cases has been adopted. But our institutions are a realization of certain ideas. What is the source of those ideas? . . .

There were many visionaries among the first Swedenborgians. As to those who were not, they could not altogether escape the influence of the visionaries, nor in general the action of the philosophic currents which then agitated men's minds. Their manner of interpreting Swedenborg shows this clearly; and when they began the visible organization of the Church, they took care to shape it in conformity with the Rights of Man and the individualistic principles set forth by the philosophers of the Encyclopedia. On this matter an important historical study might well be written. It would be very interesting indeed to trace out to what extent certain dominant ideas peculiar to the beginnings of the New Church descended in direct line from Rousseau, the Encyclopedia, the romantic visionaries, and the indi-

vidualistic philosophers who were disciples of Kant. . . .

I maintain that we are facing a serious situation. If we do not ourselves know what we mean to affirm by the visible organization of our Church, or if we are not in agreement as to the meaning and importance of that organization, we shall never accomplish anything real and definitive. We must therefore try to bring some order into the disorder of our ideas, and to come to an agreement on certain fundamental definitions. Whatever is confused and badly defined lacks intelligibility. A problem badly stated will never be solved, whereas one that has been well stated is already half solved, as everyone knows.

I am therefore going to try to set forth the essential ideas concerning the nature of the Church. In order to do this, I shall be obliged to have recourse to certain metaphysical reasonings, because metaphysics is the field of universal and abstract principles without which the idea of "being" cannot be defined. Now, it is evidently the *being* of the Church which is the matter before us for definition, if we are to understand its essential nature, and to apply a remedy to the present state of things, if there is need.

Before being a tangible *quantity,* the Church is a *quality;* for every name implies the existence of a particular quality in the object or being to which the name applies.

Whence comes the *quality* of the New Church? I mean to say, What is the origin of that quality; whence is it derived? Is it in the individual; or is it outside the individual? In order to answer this question, we must ask ourselves whether we can rightly call anything "New-Church" that has no affinity with the *New Truth* revealed by Swedenborg? If the answer is "Yes," then this New Truth is not the real *cause* of the establishment of the New Church; and one may rightly inquire why the Lord gave to the world a New Revelation. Now we are all in agreement in considering as an essential truth the Reality and the Necessity of the New Revelation. We must then answer, that the quality "New-Church" is consubstantial with that Revealed

Truth; that it is a quality *subsistent in itself* and presenting itself *as such* to our understanding, that it is not an interior quality exteriorized by men. *The term "New Church," then, designates essentially an ensemble of qualities which as an ensemble is identified with the objective Truth presented to our understanding in the Writings of Swedenborg.* This is neither an hypothesis nor an arbitrary conception of the mind; *it is a fact.* It is, indeed, the essential fact which one must always have in mind, if one wishes to build within the limits of the real, and not erect a scaffolding for a tottering edifice on Utopian clouds.

Absolutely everything depends on this central fact. Everything rotates about it as about an axis. Every beginning, every realization which in the last analysis is not based upon and joined with that fact will *ipso facto* manifest a defect of constitution, an invalidating imperfection, an absolute flaw. In truth, the fact which dominates everything puts the question of right at the same time that it answers it.

What is *right (droit)*?

Right, for every being, consists in persevering in its being. If it is a question of the Divine, its right consists in persevering in its divinity, and conserving all the qualities, all the characteristics, constituting this divinity.

Consider Revealed Truth. It is evident that the essential characteristic of such Truth consists in its *Divinity* and in its *Objectivity.* These two qualities are consubstantial to its being, even *constitutive* of its being, for they constitute its very definition. What really is a Revealed Truth, if it be not a truth presented *objectively* in the name of *God? The persistence of the objective and Divine character of Revelation constitutes, then, the Divine Right of Truth.*

It is the same with other qualities inherent in Revealed Truth; such as unity, universality, perpetuity, and immutability. The persistence of each one of these qualities constitutes a divine right.

The same thing is true about the persistence of the *func-*

tions of Truth. To deprive Truth of the exercise of its legitimate functions is to assail its divine right, since it is depriving it of its attributes in the order of action *(in ordine ad operationem)*. The rôle of Truth consists in qualifying, in forming, in ordaining, in determining, in directing, in grouping, in unifying, etc. In other terms, its function is a *causal* function. Now, the action of a *determining* cause presupposes the existence of a *determinable* effect, without which it would be but a mere being of thought, a pure abstraction. The existence of a *qualifying* form presupposes the existence of a material *capable of being qualified;* the presence of a *composing* unity presupposes the presence of a multiplicity *capable of being composed.* In short the existence of an *active* quality presupposes the existence of a *passive* quality.

What is this quantitative multiple element which is capable of being determined, composed, and unified by the qualifying action of Truth? To state the question is to answer it. This element is the human element; it is the men who compose the body of the Church, a body whose soul is the truth. The body will not represent the soul unless it lets itself be determined by the soul whose qualities it reproduces. Now, do not forget that the rights of the soul of the Church on its body are *divine* rights, since they are the rights of Divine Truth. We have seen, indeed, that the persistence of the functional character of Truth is an integral part of its divine right. The soul of the Church, therefore, possesses the divine right to create a body in its own image; or, if you prefer, the existence of such a body constitutes for it a divine right.

We are here far removed from the prevailing conception according to which the body of the Church exists only by virtue of the union of the faithful, and is only an instrument of their particular and autonomous wills.

But before considering the consequences which must follow from the Divine Right of the constitutive element of the Church, it is necessary to study more closely the nature

of the Church when considered as a composite of soul and body.

Even before the formation of the body, it is the nature of the soul to conceive the body as being already formed. *Anima humana in se ipsa non aliter representat corpus ac formatum quamvis non formatum, seu instructum carne et ossibus.* Otherwise put,—before forming its body the soul pictures it in all its perfection of form, in all its complexity of qualities. Indeed, the soul has but to look within itself in order to be able to construct a body in its image. The soul itself is the *preëxisting quality* of the body, or its "form" as Aristotle says. Swedenborg, moreover, adopted this formula, adding to it as a corollary, that the body by virtue of its organization "was the soul in its ultimates."

One can immediately see the advantage of such definitions. The result is that the unity, the order, the harmony, the specificity which we find in the body are not *composed* qualities, but *composing* qualities, since they belong to the form, and the form is the soul of the body, that is to say, its determining principle. That which is actually determined or composed is that which is virtually capable of being determined or composed. It is the multiple elements which constitute the material of the body; or, if you prefer, it is the quantitative element by virtue of which the qualitative being, or the preëxisting form, materially exists. The soul inevitably conceives the body as a whole, as an image of its own unity. The particular quality of each part results from the quality of the ensemble *ante multiplicitatem.* It follows that before being able to compose a given ensemble with its different parts, these latter must bear the specific imprint of the quality of the ensemble. But the soul conceives not only the form of each part considered separately, but also the order which is to prevail among the parts. It follows that the unity which is to prevail among the parts, or *in multiplicitate,* has its source in the unity of the ensemble,—the ensemble conceived as such by the soul, and existing in idea *before* the parts, or *ante multiplicitatem.*

Let us illustrate these abstract principles by the aid of a concrete example. Here we have some mechanical pieces. It might seem at first glance that our machine will result simply from the assembling of these pieces. But how can we fail to see that it will be impossible to assemble a machine from detached pieces which are not *expressly constructed* to fit together and complement each other? How can we fail to see that each piece must previously have had its form determined according to the plans of the ensemble, and that it is this ensemble preëxisting as an idea which is the origin of their particular qualities? An automobile is not manufactured with stovepipes, watchsprings, bicycle wheels, and locomotive pistons; for the unity "automobile" is not secured by pieces belonging to extraneous unities, such as the units "stove," watch," "bicycle," etc. The same observation may be made concerning the unity of the body. We could never obtain a human body by gluing together the head of a horse, the body of a giraffe, and the legs of a frog, because the unit "man" must be present in each and every one of the parts which compose the human body.

I have said enough to prove to you that the multiplicity of parts is not *any multiplicity whatsoever,* but a *determined* multiplicity, having dependence on some specific unity conceived beforehand as such. The unity, the quality, the form of the whole must consequently prevail among the parts by virtue of the shaping ideals.

Swedenborg, quite logically, draws from this principle a rather unexpected, but eminently reasonable, inference. He tells us that the individual human form has its source in the universal human form, that the *minimus homo* has its source in the *maximus homo,* and not *vice versa.*

That is a fundamental principle which we need to incorporate into the ecclesiological doctrine of the New Church; for it will permit us to define the relations which should exist between the *macro-ecclesia* and the *micro-ecclesia,* that is to say, between the universal church and the individual church.

Let us speak first of the "Grand Man" or of heaven. It would be absolutely false to say that it is the angels who *compose* heaven, at least as concerns its *being* or its *quality*. Angels constitute only the *quantitative existence* of heaven. As for quality, as for informing form, heaven existed before the multitude of angels, since each angel is a *micro-urane* or a regenerated *minimus homo*.

It is the same way with the Church. As it has a quality subsisting in itself by the fact of objective Truth, it should first be considered as a composing unity and only secondarily as a composed unity. It should be *macro-ecclesia* by its *quality* and *micro-ecclesia* by the individuals who constitute its quantity. There will be as many *micro-ecclesiae* as there are individuals in the Church; but there will be only one *macro-ecclesia*, because there is but one quality constitutive of the Church, the True Church. In fact, the *being* of the whole is the *quality* which ought to rule universally in each one of its parts. It would be different if this universal quality were not identical with the objective truth which is the same for all the believers. It would be different, if the believers were themselves the qualifying element, instead of being the element which is either qualified or capable of being qualified; in other words, if truth proceeded from men instead of being imposed on them. In this case each *micro-ecclesia* would be a being *sui generis*, and the *macro-ecclesia* would be reduced to the condition of a number without unity because its common quality would be lacking. The being of such a multiplicity would be identical with its existence; for an object which has not been formed by a preëxistent quality is identical with the matter which composes it; it *is* this matter of which it only exteriorizes the particular qualities; in a word, it is an object without a soul. Such would man be if, instead of interiorizing objective truth, he exteriorized his own thoughts promoted to the rank of truths. I leave it to you to guess what the unity of an aggregate composed of such men would be. Such an aggregate is not unthinkable. The

proof of that statement is the fact that the order of government that suits it is considered by many people to be an ideal government. I regret to state that it is precisely that order which we ourselves have adopted without completely taking into account what we were doing.

In fact every order based on number is based on the free expression of the will of those who constitute that number. The organization of our church is just what we wished to make it. The idea that the divine right of the church might have its word to say, did not occur to us. We simply did not raise that question. The *being* of the church was the last of our cares. We adopted a point of view purely pragmatic, and under the banner of the quantitative. We considered the church as a purely individual reality, and the organization of a collective association as a simple human aggregate, or at most as a practical necessity destined to extend and coordinate our individual efforts. No ecclesiological doctrine was at our disposal to enlarge the field of our intellectual vision, and to modify our individualist and subjectivist point of view. We thought we were doing well in offering to our members a democratic or congregationalist constitution, designed to safeguard the liberty of all and the interior character of the Church. The idea that the external form of the Church ought to be an embodiment of its very being would have appeared to us not only extraordinary but even monstrous. The fact is that the old Protestant prejudice, according to which the spiritual is a synonym for the invisible, still exercised all its power over our reason, in spite of the fact that Swedenborg teaches us that the form is the *alter ego* of the soul in the body. We had a holy horror of formalism, which is indeed a bad thing; and the mere evocation of the specter of Babylon struck terror into the bravest among us. Even today, whoever raises that specter before us can be sure that it will have some effect. . . . The fact is that we are still in the romantic period of youth, whereas the time should have arrived for the classic period of mature age. Romanticism

seeks within the individual himself the criterion of all things, from which comes his tendency to exalt the originality of his subjective sentiments and of his personal ideas; and from it also arises his love for an unrestricted liberty, and his dislike for anything which might appear to be an external restraint. Romanticism feels a real horror for static being, while it worships passionately the dynamism of becoming, even if this be a tumultuous torrent which sows disorder and ruin.

Classicism, on the other hand, loves what is reasonable. It seeks the measure of things not in the mysterious depths of the human self but in universal laws to which this self should submit in order to be a part of an organic and harmonious ensemble. Thus it will always seek to subject *quantity* to the discipline of *quality*. The dynamism of *becoming* is under its suspicion as long as that becoming is not a step towards *being,* towards *ideally pre-existent being.* Do not think that I am here straying from my subject. On the contrary, I am in the very midst of it, because I am acquainted with romantic ideology through having myself participated in it in connection with the problem of human becoming with reference to the Church. I am only characterizing certain of our prejudices by considering them as romantic.

I have not the time to analyze the philosophic side of the dominant ideas which alone would justify the conception of the nature of the Church which we have hitherto had. You must take me at my word when I say that that conception harmonizes perfectly with the philosophy called *nominalist,* whereas that of Swedenborg is *realist.* For Swedenborg, indeed, the determining *quality* is a *reality,* a veritable *cause,* pre-existing in relation to its effect; whereas for the nominalist quality belongs to object themselves, and is reduced to a simple *name* in the degree to which our intelligence mentally sets it apart from those objects. We are, then, nominalists to the degree that we identify the quality of the Church with that of individuals, instead of considering it as a cause subsisting in itself, *ante multiplicitatem,* and acting on individuals. . . .

What renders the expounding of my subject so difficult is that it is impossible to treat the questions seriatim, for each one of them implies all the others; to touch on one of them is *ipso facto* to raise every other. We are not face to face with a multitude of problems more or less connected, but face to face with one single problem which challenges our minds under all its aspects simultaneously. There is not one special problem of quality and quantity, another special problem of unity and multiplicity, a third of the universal and the individual, a fourth of the objective and the subjective, a fifth of ensemble and part, a sixth of being and existing, a seventh of form and matter, an eighth of Divine Right and human right, a ninth of authority and liberty, a tenth of the episcopal system and the congregationalist system, etc. All these problems unite to make only one. To say form is to say quality, to say quality is to say being, to say being is to say cause, to say cause is to say objective, to say objective is to say universal, to say universal is to say Divine Right, to say Divine Right is to say authority, to say authority is to say unity, and to say unity is to say unitary organization. All these things are bound together solidly; they are mutually controlled, and are interchangeable. It is quite the same with regard to the principles which constitute the other element of the problem. Quantity, multiplicity, existence, effect, subjective, individual, particular, human right, personal liberty, diversity, congregationalism, all imply each other, and each is explained by the others. We have thus before us a single problem; and to deal adequately with it, we should consider each of its elements in its relation to all the others. Unfortunately to do this would involve innumerable repetitions which would weary even the best sustained attention. What is to be done, then?

It seems to me that the only solution consists in begging my readers never to lose sight of the interlinking and coexistence of the things which imply each other, and not to forget that a thing has no meaning to our minds unless we keep it in its context.

What matters most for the Church is to choose wisely its determining principle. A choice must be made between the ensemble of a qualitative system and the ensemble of a quantitative system. On this choice will depend the ensemble of the qualities of the Church. Now, I maintain that in the New Church this choice is not free, because our attitude is determined by the existence of a divine deed, that is, by the existence of an exterior and objective Revelation. As I have already indicated, this objectivity of truth confers a Divine Right *(un Droit Divin)* in relation to the causal priority which should exist between quality and quantity, between unity and multiplicity, between being and existence, between universal and particular, between the whole and the part, etc. *Institutions which confer the rights of the divine cause upon human matters will themselves be of divine right,—not directly, it is true, but by derivation.*

Actually, the juridical base of our various groupings is not the Divine Right, but rather a contractual right, resulting from the conventional character of these associations. The federal or congregationalist bond which unites us is in fact but the contractual or conventional bond which *re*-unites us. It is a bond whose nature and extent we have freely determined, and which we have legally the right to modify or even abolish, if the fancy strikes us.

You will remind me that a human convention will always be necessary to give the Church a concrete existence, and that Divine Right itself will be nothing so long as physical persons have not put at its disposal the necessary means of accomplishment. Nothing is more exact. It is evident, for example, that justice would be but an inoperative abstraction, were there not a code of laws determined by the legislator. But that does not preclude the fact that it is justice which makes the law just, and not the law which makes justice just. Let those of you who have read Plato recall the question which Socrates asks of Euthyphron:

> Do the gods love piety [or justice] because it is pious [or just], or is piety pious [or justice just] because the gods love it?

A person is a realist or a nominalist according to the

answer he makes. We are realists because we admit that justice is a *reality,* independent of anyone's good pleasure, even that of the inhabitants of Olympus.

It is clear, I have already said, that the human will should intervene in the institution of every system of order. But the adoption of a system considered as the expression or the safeguard of a right superior to individuals is one thing, and the establishment of a system in which the will of the contracting parties itself constitutes the right is quite another.

A system in which sovereignty belongs to *number* does not need to be right in order to validate its acts. A vote of the majority suffices; for truth does not vote. There is offered no mode of recourse from the decisions of the majority; these decisions will be *legal,* even when they are not *right!*

It would be quite different in a system of government founded on making the sovereignty of truth the right. Such a system would possess proper organs and recognized defenders. Its representatives would not impose their preferences or their arbitrary will. For them it would merely be a question of being *right,* of being in line with the truth, for their acts to be valid.

Our decision as concerns the institution of the Church is therefore not free. In truth a superior legitimacy and a pre-existing right do not create themselves; they do but declare themselves and define themselves; and if we decide to recognize them, we must accept them *as they are* and submit to them, and this under conditions which will assure them respect and maintenance.

If we desire the moral person of our Church to be not any moral person whatsoever, after the fashion of a professional society or an ordinary benevolent association, but on the contrary a moral personality whose soul, as an intelligible essence, as a qualifying being, or as an organizing form, is pre-existent to the will of the parts,—in other words, if we desire the moral personality of our Church to

be that of our spiritual mother, that of the Bride of the Lord, and not the collective personality of a club of pious folk, we must in all necessity make its statutes conform to Divine Right. For do not forget that the soul communicates with the body through the form which it gives to the body. It is not the right of the clay to give orders to the potter; but, as we are intelligent clay, we can enter into the designs of the potter, and *freely take on* the form which is destined for us; for, as I have already said, the Church is not a quality inherent in men, but a quality which is incorporated in them from without, by means of the truth.

The mission of the visible Church is to teach the truth. It has the right and the duty to organize with that end in view. Its statutes should be conceived in such manner that they should constitute above all a safeguard for the truth. A Church which is not a *teaching* Church, but a simple *interior and subjective reality,* would never be able to maintain the *exterior and objective* character of the Revelation. A Church conceived and organized as a multiplicity of individuals or societies would never be able to protect either the unity or the universality of the Doctrine. The New Church, then, *must* subsist exteriorly; it *must* be one and universal: Unless it is, it will be but the expression of human right.

Does that mean that Divine Right excludes human right? Not at all! But human rights, which are essentially the rights of a majority, must be subordinated to the rights of Truth. Individual liberty should be at the base of the *taught* Church, whereas Divine Right should constitute the foundation of the *teaching* Church. As a matter of fact, man would never be able to interiorize the universal truth of the Church, and transform it by love into particular good, unless he possessed freedom of reason and sentiment. This freedom is the psychological condition which is the *sine qua non* of human participation in the spiritual quality of the Church; for man should not only be *in* the Church but *of* the Church; and this by virtue of the already stated prin-

ciple in accordance with which the part will only be an integral part of the ensemble to the degree in which it *interiorizes* the pre-existent universal quality. The authority of the teaching Church and the freedom of the taught Church are both necessary, the first by virtue of the Divine Right of the ensemble, the second by virtue of the human right of the individual.

The Roman Catholic Church suppressed the freedom of its believers in the name of the authority of the whole over the parts; the Protestants suppressed the authority of the Church in the name of the sovereignty of the parts over the whole,—that is to say, in the name of individual freedom. The point in both cases was unpardonable excess; but to escape the one, we must not fall into the other. Authority and freedom should not be mutually exclusive, but should complement each other. It behooves the New Church to re-establish equilibrium between them, and put each in its place. The main point, however, is that we should not make a mistake and *invert the order of subordination.*

The visible existence of a teaching Church bears witness to the existence of a qualifying principle superior to individuals. It is an exterior framework into which man can enter. Now, the fact of entering this framework constitutes for man the permanent possibility of assimilating its spirit. The permanent existence of truth in the visible Church is on a par with the perpetual possibility of good in the hearts of men. That is why the existence and the stability of the Church *ante multiplicitatem* constitutes the best guarantee for the establishment of the Church *in multiplicitate.*

The teaching Church is impersonal; its worth is in its doctrine and not in men, because it is based on truth which is a pure quality. But the taught Church possesses a personal character; it achieves its worth by the quality of its members, because it is composed, by definition, of human beings. In order for the taught Church to be really "the Church" considered *in multiplicitate,* it must live according to the

truth which the teaching Church, *ante multiplicitatem,* presents to it. That is a personal obligation for every one of the believers. They have faith, if they believe in the truth of the Church; but, if they have not charity, no matter if they have the *true* faith, they will not have *real* faith; in other words, they will not veritably have faith in the veritable faith. But this lack of individual charity has no influence on the intrinsic quality of truth such as Divine Wisdom has revealed to the Church, without which God himself would exist only to the degree in which he is found in virtuous people upon earth. It is possible for the taught Church not to be faithful to the doctrine of the teaching Church; but as long as it remains united to the latter by a visible organic bond, the possibility of itself *becoming* "the Church" will remain, for truth in the intellect is the possibility or potentiality of good in the heart. That is why the visible Church will always be legitimate as long as it maintains intact this possibility or this potentiality. In fact, it is because the Church *is* what it *is,* that the believers *can become* what they *ought to become.*

In the *micro-ecclesia,* or in man, the teaching Church corresponds to the intellect or to faith; whereas the taught Church corresponds to the will or to charity. Now you know very well that man cannot have charity in his will unless he has faith in his understanding. It follows that the relation of causal priority which exists between the intellect and the will in the *micro-ecclesia,* should likewise exist in the *macro-ecclesia,* that is to say, between the teaching Church and the taught Church; for just as truth should first be apprehended by the intellect in order subsequently to be transmitted to the will, so Revelation should first be apprehended by the teaching Church in order subsequently to be transmitted to the taught Church.

But in order that this may take place without the unity of truth suffering, the Church by every necessity should be one and universal in its existence as in its being, in its body as in its soul.

Now, truth being a *quality,* does not weigh heavily in the scale against quantity or number. It is necessary therefore that its authority, its qualifying power, have at its disposal an instrument capable of acting with efficiency on the plane of quantity. The soul itself would have no power on the chemical elements of the body, if it did not possess certain material organs which assure to it the control of the body.

The governmental prerogatives of truth, the doctrinal mastership of the Church, must then be exercised by physical persons. These persons should be the priests, and their function will be the priesthood.

Note clearly that *the priesthood is not the function of men, but of the Church as a Church.* The priests are not deputies of the believers, but deputies of the Truth which is the soul of the Church. In a Church which is but a simple association of individuals, priesthood can in consequence be no more than a fiction, and this by definition, unless the admission is made that the priesthood is *universal,* that is to say, that it exists in each individual in particular. That is the reason why we see all religious communities with an individualist base adopt this subjectivist conception of the priesthood. Now, if everyone is a priest in general, no one at all is a priest in particular. Churches with a democratic organization are perfectly logical in not having "priests" but only "ministers." To say of a priest that he is a priest because everybody is a priest, is as if one should say that Jesus Christ is divine because all men are divine, which would be to deny his Divinity.

In the New Church we cannot admit the theory of a universal priesthood any more than we can admit that it is the mere call to the priesthood which constitutes the priesthood; for that would be still another individualistic and subjectivistic interpretation.

On the other hand, we cannot accept the Catholic theory according to which the priesthood is irrevocably transmitted to the consecrated individual by virtue of the apostolic succession.

The juridical statute of priesthood in the New Church should depend on the juridical statute of the Church itself. It should be consubstantial with the divine right of the universal quality acting on the multiplicity of which the Church as an existing body is composed. We shall then have a veritable *priesthood* to the degree that we shall have a veritable *Church,* a single and universal Church founded on divine right.

I have not the time to take up this question more in detail, nor to make clear to you why the episcopal order is the only one which can bring to realization the visible unity, both qualitative and quantitative, of the New Church, and maintain it in its Divine Right. . . .

I must, however, close with a practical conclusion. Here is the conclusion. Unity, unity, unity! It is all very well for us to unite in sentiment; but this unity of our hearts does not suffice to create the unity of the Church, for the latter is the unity of a *certainty,* and not alone the union of certain people. The accord of hearts in a discord of thoughts will not take us very far, for such purely sentimental accord will serve but to mask and will consequently perpetuate our intellectual discord. Let us then unify our thoughts, and commune together in a self-same certainty. We *can* do it, we *should* do it.

What we have lacked up to now has been a sane ecclesiological doctrine which states the problem amply and takes account of all of its elements. I have tried to put my finger on some of these elements. I have kept to generalities because the general is the law of the particular. I have appealed to your intelligence because the intellect is the organ by which we apprehend the universal.

A true ecclesiological doctrine will infallibly cure certain of our individualistic and subjectivistic prejudices whose function is but to create and perpetuate disorder. We must not, however, believe that unity is natural to men, and that it can be established hap-hazardly. It is on the contrary a work of art, difficult, exacting, the application of architec-

tonic principles clearly defined. What we can do is to inscribe these principles on our banner in order to carry them forward together to victory. The road is rough, I know, for we shall have to convert all our co-religionists to our point of view. A first step on this road will have been taken when we decide to adopt the new creed* now submitted to the consideration of our pastors. This creed makes the Divine Right, the unity, and the universality of the Church an article of faith. The adoption of such a creed will constitute by that very fact an historic act of universal scope, for it will indicate for the first time in the annals of the New Church the desire of men to conform to the true being and to the Divine Right of the Church. This solemn affirmation of our conscience will result in being heard wherever there are men who put respect for truth above all else. Let us prepare to wage the battle for the good cause, and to that end let us arm ourselves intellectually. Let us accumulate *reasons* rather than texts; for the battle of texts serves only to confuse even the most simple problems, whereas reasons which are universally valid cause order and light to arise on every side. . . .

HENRY G. DE GEYMULLER.

*The Editors have not seen this creed.

HUMANISM VERSUS NATURALISM

A Review of Mercier's "The Challenge of Humanism"

By the Rev. Lewis Field Hite, A.M.

THE present turmoil of the world raises grave apprehension for the future of human welfare and for civilization itself. The widespread unrest and upheaval of economic and industrial forces are fully matched by social, moral, and religious confusion and strife. Millions upon millions of unemployed in the centers of industry, constantly threatened with starvation and with the loss of home and suitable clothing, and yet in a nation with a superabundance of food and of all the products of farm and factory staring them in the face, call imperatively for permanent relief. The farms and factories cannot sell, because the unemployed have no money to spend. This is an intolerable condition with no apparent remedy. The money to feed, clothe, and house the unemployed must come from industry, and industry cannot proceed indefinitely when there is no profitable sale for the products. Various expedients and makeshifts are in operation; hours are shortened and wages are maintained at least at a minimum, child labor is abolished, extensive public works are provided. In this way unemployment is somewhat reduced for able bodied men and women. Meanwhile, improved machinery is rapidly taking the place of men, and the problem of unemployment remains as an appalling and stubborn threat to the integrity of civilization. The disastrous industrial depression may be traced to conflict of principles and violation of law. The unregulated operation of the motive of profit has led to rivalry and excess of production, and to ruinous speculation in financial securities. The rights of

public and private interests have been obscured and violated. Self interest has been primary and paramount, while public interest has been made subservient. With this we pass from politics and economics to morals.

There is one moral principle, and it is at the same time a religious principle, which should govern the whole conduct of human affairs. It is the principle taken from Holy Writ: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Love of the neighbor, and of the public welfare as the larger neighbor, is the first principle of good conduct in all relations of private, social, and public life. If this principle were rigorously maintained and operative in industrial life, it would forbid and prevent extortion, and the exploitation of the inordinate appetites, as well as the exigencies of weak and needy men and women. It would put an end to hostile tariffs, and to military aggression, and it would transform the world into a veritable co-operative union. It substitutes the motive of use as paramount for the motive of profit. The moral level of the community would be raised and purified. All this would be an immense gain; but the practical problems of industry and economics would remain. For the solution of these practical problems, practical methods and practical programs are needed. Laws may be passed to define and protect the rights of persons and property, to correct abuses and prevent crime; but laws need to be applied to particular cases, and the laws must be based upon good judgment and wide experience in the light of guiding principles. The supreme guiding principle is the love of others, and this is a religious as well as a moral principle. We proclaim the virtue of love for all mankind, but this love does not really exist among men; we may love all men in idea and in sentiment, but we do not love them in act. Only the Lord loves all men with a perfect and constant love; He is the prime source of the love of others, and we transmit this love to the extent that we receive and express it. Herein lies the connection between morality and religion. The practical question is, how to apply this principle

to concrete situations. For example, industry is directly or indirectly a matter of buying and selling. The farmer sells his wheat to the miller, the miller sells his flour to the baker, the baker sells his bread to his customers, the customers eat the bread for strength to labor and sell their labor to the factory, the factory sells the products to the people for use in securing and increasing the comforts of life to enable them to do better the work of farm and factory; such is the circle of industry, of buying and selling. The principle of love of others requires that the buyer be willing to pay a fair price for what he gets; and it requires the seller to charge only a fair price for what he sells. Such fair dealing might come under the principle of "Honesty is the best policy," but this principle may lack the moral and religious sanction of the law of love. It is obvious that the application of this principle would work an immense transformation in the business of the world. This principle, however, would of itself not determine the fair price of the bushel of wheat, the barrel of flour, or the loaf of bread. This must be determined by the cost of production, including labor, maintenance, wear and tear, distribution, sufficient profit to secure personal comfort and welfare, present and future; these are the considerations which must determine the price, not what the people, from necessity or for convenience, would be willing to pay. Nor would this principle of love determine how much wheat to raise, or how and where to sell it. Human needs, buying power, the status of industry, the rate of exchange, tariff obstruction, and such considerations, must be taken into account in determining the amount of wheat to be raised and the price. Applying this principle in the field of politics, the law of love requires that private interest be subordinated in proper measure to the public welfare. We are witnessing now the complications and the difficulties involved in the clash of private interests and public welfare, a clash which has persisted from the foundation of government, and will continue unless private interests

are subjected to the control and direction of principles of right conduct in view of the public welfare. It is difficult to say how far the uncontrolled operations of private and corporate interests are responsible for the existing disastrous industrial depression; but it is obvious that enormous sums of money have been wrung from the great body of people, and passed into the possession and control of private individuals and huge corporations, so that now there is a steadily growing demand that this money be widely distributed. But it can be distributed rightfully only through industry; it cannot be taken directly from the pockets of the possessors and handed over to the many who need it; and even if it were, the situation would not be permanently altered. Fundamentally, it is industry that must be recovered and re-established; this is the problem which civilization is facing, and it must be faced with a new set of principles, principles all derived from and directed by the principle of love, the love of others. As applied to industry, these principles so derived are in the first place, fair prices, fair wages, and fair profits. How these are to be determined, further principles must decide; for example, the principle of cost—the cost of raw materials, machinery, interest charges, etc. These again involve prices, wages, and profits. So we are plunged into almost endless complications, and we are brought to one of the characteristic and most baffling features of modern civilization, immense complexity. To this feature is due largely the confusion and clash of economic, social, and moral theories. Modern life is so complex, and the clash of interests and views is so intense as well as extensive, that the convictions and principles of the past have been variously uprooted. The modern temper is given to discrediting and repudiating the past. As a result, fixed and settled principles have been presumptuously and arrogantly abandoned, and life has plunged without a guide into an ocean of experimentation. The spirit of self-sufficiency has vauntingly seized the helm, with the assertion that man is good in his own strength.

This spirit is deep-seated and has a long history. It is necessary to review some of the phases of this history in order to understand the modern drift to naturalism and atheism.

Fortunately, we have a recent book, Professor Mercier's "The Challenge of Humanism,"* which summarizes this history in a very effective way. The book is a careful study and a thoughtful exposition of the work of three leading critics of naturalism from the time of the Renaissance to the present day,—the work of Paul Elmer More, Irving Babbitt, and Ernest Seillière. The most thoroughgoing, consistent, and influential of these critics is Irving Babbitt, whose work is really monumental.

Professor Mercier writes as a reverent and faithful Catholic; and this speaks for the breadth of view and thoroughness of the book. His attitude towards the bearing of his subject is succinctly stated in a quotation from Babbitt:

> When studied with any degree of thoroughness, the economic problem will be found to run into the political problem, the political problem in turn into the philosophical problem, and the philosophical problem itself to be almost indissolubly bound up at last with the religious problem.

The author adds pertinently:

> The wholesale breakdown of the economic system and the threatened collapse of the political systems of the nineteenth century which followed the unprecedented tragedy of the World War may well lead us to inquire whether the quality of our philosophical thought and its relation to religion, do not, indeed, need to be re-examined.

This re-examination of one stream of philosophical thought has been done with a master's hand by Irving Babbitt, the stream which is well outlined by the terms "Renaissance," "Romanticism," and "Humanism," all of them currents in the stream of Naturalism. When the rude and fierce tribes of the north swept down upon the decadent Roman Empire, Greek and Roman civilization passed

*_The Challenge of Humanism;_ an Essay in Comparative Criticism. By Louis J. A. Mercier. New York: Oxford University Press. 1933. 288 pp. Price, $3.00.

under a dense dark cloud. About ten centuries after, when the Turks captured Constantinople, Greek and Roman scholarship and scholars were dispersed over educated Europe, and the minds of students were aroused to new interests and activities. The conviction that "the proper study of mankind is man" was deeply and strongly fixed. The Greek and Roman classics gave pictures of human life that were immensely stimulating to thought and emotion; the result was an epochal movement which we call the Revival of Learning, the Renaissance. The intellectual activity which accompanied this fresh study of man burst forth into a new development of natural science. Thereafter the study of men and the study of the world went hand in hand, each supporting and inspiring the other. This fresh interest and employment gave a sense of freedom which was felt as a re-action against the restrictions and the discipline of the Catholic Church, and thereupon the antagonism between religion and science began, and grew ever more intense and widespread. This re-action against the Church was concentrated and made effective in the Protestant Reformation. The new and enthusiastic devotion to the study of nature took two main closely associated directions, which resulted in two vigorous and firmly established types of philosophy, namely, Naturalism and Humanism. Naturalism proceeds on the presupposition that Nature is all there is,—in other words, that the universe which we know as the system of bodies and their behavior includes all that really is; while Humanism proceeds on the principle that man is an independent self-sufficient being, essentially and naturally good. This has meant, in the association of these two philosophies, that man is a part of nature, and as a consequence "all things are from nature." To this full fledged naturalism Deism and Pantheism are passing stages. Deism retains the idea of God and immortality, but rejects Revelation. But when God is thought of as immanent in nature, His transcendence is neglected, thus He becomes identical with nature. The final outcome is that God, Man,

and nature are completely merged, and we have a Monism which inevitably drifts into unalloyed Materialism. Now the Humanism of Babbitt and his group is a systematic protest against the whole tendency and outcome of this naturalistic philosophy; and this protest is maintained by expounding the view that man as such is separate and distinct from the rest of the universe. But the Humanism of the Renaissance was a natural development of newly awakened interest in the study of man without as yet any deliberate contrast with either religion on the one hand or with natural science on the other. With the rapid growth of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Humanism widened into Naturalism. Man was considered to be a part of nature, and nature was viewed as a mechanical system governed by uniform and undeviating laws. In this system man also was a machine. Curiously enough, human institutions and especially human government were supposed to have begun with the agreement among primitive men to co-operate and organize for common purposes. Primitive men were imagined to have been naturally good and socially well disposed, but in time were corrupted by the opportunities and abuses of organized effort. This was the "Social Contract" theory of Thomas Hobbes. This fiction of the primitive man, and the view of institutions as perverting and corrupting, found an enthusiastic spokesman in J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778). Beginning with the idea that man is naturally good, Rousseau's emotional imagination led him to look upon the unrestrained expression of feeling, impulse, emotion, desire, as the right and proper way of living a good life, and the sure way of achieving true manhood. This type is properly called sentimental and emotional humanism, and it has close affinity with emotional and sentimental types of mysticism. In German Idealism and especially in German Romanticism we see the transition from humanism to what may be called transcendental naturalism. In Herder, for example, the human soul merged with the national soul, and the

national soul with the soul of humanity. In Fichte and the rest we see the transition from the human ego to the absolute ego. These flights are taken on the wings of highly wrought imagination and sentiment, but the practical consequences were serious and disastrous. The universal idea was thought to be embodied successively in the great historic nations, and was to find its complete embodiment in the German nation. The individual man becomes merged with the higher consciousness of the nation; he lives from, in, and for the State. For this philosophy the Prussian state fulfilled the ideal, and had as its mission the duty of extending the ideal universally over mankind. Naturally, this exalted self-importance found expression in war, as the appropriate means of fulfilling the nation's mission. War is "an inevitable crisis in the development of the idea"; such is "the moral essence of war." The victorious state is *ipso facto* better than the vanquished state, "nearer to the ideal state"; "its triumph is the condemnation of the principle represented by the vanquished state." The turn for the Germans had come. Such was the logic that brought on the World War. Excessive nationalism, pride in national importance, will be exploited by the special interests to bring on the next war; it substitutes international hate for international love; it is a perversion of emotional and sentimental activity.

But such perversion is due to a lack of well grounded principles of action, the lack of standards by which to judge both motive and conduct. Naturalistic humanism leads to blind self-assertion on the plea of self-expression. When the natural self is taken to be good, then uncontrolled self-expression becomes the fundamental principle of life and conduct. The principle of control is abandoned, and the course of life is subject to every whim of fancy and every gust of feeling. Self-interest becomes the sole and sufficient motive; the welfare and rights of others are ignored or exploited. When men's minds become possessed of the idea that nature is all there is, and that mankind is a part

of nature, the motives of life are lowered and impoverished. Men no longer look to the Lord for help and direction, nor to the future life for the fulfilment of their most cherished ideals and aspirations. They are left to the vain pursuit of temporary satisfactions, personal comforts and conveniences, and worldly position. The world becomes a passing show; conflicting and fleeting impulses and desires take on the character of a bad dream. Thus man is a changing current in a changing world, a ship tossed on a stormy sea without rudder and without a port in view. This has been very much the condition of the Christian world for the last two centuries. In spite of amazing mechanical inventions and improvements, in spite of the advance in industrial technique and organization, the lives of men are in large part wretched, without guidance, and without promise, totally absorbed in the struggle for existence, for competence, and for gain. These conditions are due to some extent to institutions, political, economic, industrial, and social, but they are due fundamentally to false principles and false standards, to false philosophies which permeate the minds and lives of all classes. There are, it is true, individuals and groups, devoted to humanitarian ideas and efforts, that profess and proclaim moral and religious principles, but these principles are not put into actual operation; instead, the practical methods of humanitarianism, and their application, are alone considered of importance. In other words, humanitarianism is substituted for religion under the name of Social Ethics. God is identified with good deeds, while any other knowledge or acknowledgment of God is discredited as Theology. Revelation is absolutely rejected as a survival in an age of enlightenment. As a substitute for Revelation, one's own highly wrought emotional and sentimental states enjoy a mystic reference to a Divine source; in fact God is identified with these states. With this dominating sense of unique superiority, all tradition and authority are swept aside; self-confidence and self-expression become the ruling principles

of life. Every man is a law unto himself, and an outlaw with respect to all others and to all institutions. As a consequence, the most sacred and approved obligations are ignored, the ties of married life are broken at will and pleasure. Through the manipulation of funds which represent the business of other people, millions upon millions of money is piled up to the advantage of individuals and corporations, and added to the burdens of tax payers and industries. Greed for gain, the desire to get something for nothing, inspires and directs high positions in financial and corporate operations; the same motives are at work among the lowly, and the desperate form organized bands of gangsters which plunder in league. The breakdown of principles and standards gives free rein to the grasping and the lawless. This is especially and fundamentally the case when the principles and obligations of religion and morality are cast aside; for then the moral tone of the community as a whole is lowered, and all effective restraint upon self-indulgence and self-seeking is removed. Individuals are left without a guide to roam at will and prey upon their fellowmen to the full extent of their power and opportunities, and to combine with others for the same purpose; business, private and corporate, becomes rapacious, inordinate speculation runs riot in financial and industrial operations, huge debts are incurred, credit is ruined, productive activities are deranged and brought to an end, and people are left without employment and without means of subsistence. So governments are now burdened with the obligation to feed, clothe, and house helpless millions of their citizens. These conditions are traceable to the philosophy of life which characterizes our age, the worst spiritual, moral, and business depression known to history.

The book before us undertakes a critical analysis and discussion of the humanistic and naturalistic current of philosophy which has flowed steadily and with ever widening scope through European history from the Renaissance to the present day. In the Middle Ages, Christianity molded

the character and conduct of men; it was a supremely dynamic and progressive period. It may surprise many of our readers to be told that

> Between 1100 and 1500 more social, political, intellectual, and artistic development was achieved in western Europe than in the 400 years since.

This takes into account the low ebb to which civilization had sunk after the time of Charlemagne as a result of the wreck made by the invasion of the Northmen. The dominant principle of the Middle Ages was devotion to religion and the supernatural. The Renaissance was a re-action in part against this pre-occupation, but it was most of all a zealous pursuit of human interests as such, distinct from religious tradition. This motive led to "a violent assertion of individualism," and "issued in what may be called the era of humanistic civilization which lasted into the eighteenth century." The course of this humanism makes it "evident that the civilization of a given era depends largely upon the prevalent conception as to the nature of man." There are several historical views as to the nature of man. The Greeks and Stoics thought that man is able to learn easily the laws of a well-ordered human life, and to follow them. Christianity accepted the view that man can only with difficulty learn the laws of life, and even then he may not obey them; so he needs the assurance of the Grace of God. A third view is that man is naturally good, and has only to let himself go, without any restraint on the part of the intellect, to achieve a virtuous life. This is the Rousseauistic view, the view of naturalistic humanism. "It is this optimism which differentiates the era of naturalism, beginning with the eighteenth century, from the era of humanism, beginning with the Renaissance." The humanism of the Renaissance period was only partly naturalistic; it did not deny Revelation, the supernatural, nor immortality. The two distinguished representatives of humanism of this period, Rabelais and Montaigne, were not irreligious, not atheists. It is true that in the humanism of the Renaissance,

as in all humanism, there is an undercurrent of naturalism, and this naturalism tends constantly to force its way to the front. In this discussion, it is important to bear in mind that naturalism, like humanism, is an ambiguous term. Nature may mean not only the universe of physical bodies and their behavior, but it may include the force or forces behind or beyond the moving bodies, the cause of the motions. In this sense, the meaning of "natural" may well include what is ordinarily meant by supernatural. On the other hand, the word natural may mean what belongs to the nature of the thing, its essential character. Here again the meaning of "natural" may include what we ordinarily call the spiritual, as when we use the phrase "the essence of man as a spiritual being." Humanism also has more meanings than one. It may be used in a sense to include the whole nature of man, spiritual as well as natural; but there is always a tendency to exclude the spiritual by emphasizing "man as such," distinct from the outer world and from the supernatural. This is the constant effort throughout the history of humanism.

The essence of naturalism is the principle that nature takes in all that really is; obviously this is a denial of the supernatural. Naturalism is especially interested to maintain that all religious life is a natural development, to the deliberate exclusion of any supernatural agency. Naturalism, like materialism, is a common inheritance of all mankind. Our sense-impressions and the practical demands of every-day life enforce a naturalistic habit of thought and conduct. We may therefore expect naturalism, obscure or blatant, to appear in all philosophic currents. From the establishment of Christianity until the eighteenth century, naturalism was a minor trend in European philosophy; but by the middle of the eighteenth century it began to displace humanism, at least humanism of the distinctive kind. It was the time of "the great rejections." A complete cleavage between the natural and the supernatural was established. It was also a time of violent re-action not only

against Christian tradition, but also against Greek and Latin tradition. Furthermore, naturalism was at this period strongly supported by the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; it has had this ally with growing influence ever since. This naturalistic movement summed up all the doctrines opposed to humanism, and bequeathed these doctrines to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, naturalism went through the transition period of English Deism. This Deism retained the idea of God as Creator, but rejected Revealed Christianity, and with it belief in Providence, Revelation, and Miracles; but it retained belief in the supernatural and in immortality. In effect, it replaced Revealed Christianity with a natural religion. But Deism was a mere transition stage to Pantheism. The idea of God as Creator and as the author of the laws of nature led to identifying God with these laws. This is to think of God as immanent; then the transition is easy, if not inevitable, to pantheistic naturalism, virtually identical with that of Stoicism. Pantheistic naturalism came to its full development in German Idealism. The idea of God disappears in the all-embracing Absolute, God becomes the impersonal All-One, in which all Nature and all individuals are merged, so that we have a completely monistic philosophy, the most all-embracing in history. God, man, and Nature are merged in the All-One, a view which may profess to be spiritualistic, but which lends itself easily to a materialistic interpretation. The transition from pantheism to materialism seems inevitable; but materialistic naturalism had a distinct development in the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Condillac, and others. In this, man was viewed as a machine in a universe of matter in motion. The naturalism of this period, the eighteenth century, took a new turn, powerfully re-enforced by agencies of constantly increasing influence; it was extensively grounded and strongly supported by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and by the ration-

alism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Under this stimulus naturalism took a firmer hold on the minds and lives of men, and in the course of time absorbed humanism under the stimulus of the "State of Nature" fiction. Against this whole naturalistic trend and course, the humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More is a systematic protest.

The last two paragraphs present a rapid sketch of the substance and the argument of the book in its first chapter, "The Renaissance of Humanism." We have next to deal with Babbitt's criticism and exposition of the course of naturalism and humanism through the modern period. Chapters II and III give us an interesting and important summary of Babbitt's work in the field of modern criticism, and of the psychology which underlies his interpretations of the moral life, under the titles "The Challenge to Naturalism" and "The Psychology of Irving Babbitt."

Babbitt was an unusually well prepared and a highly competent critic. He knew the Greek and Latin languages and literatures; he studied the ancient languages of India under Sylvain Levi at the *École des Hautes Études* in Paris; he made himself acquainted with the literatures and the philosophies of modern western Europe; and he did this with especial attention to the currents of philosophic thought which directed the course of these literatures. He selected for special investigation humanism, naturalism, romanticism, and the more recent phase of modernism. As a result of these studies, he brought out a succession of books: "Literature and the American College" (1908), "Masters of French Criticism" (1912), "Rousseau and Romanticism" (1919), "Democracy and Leadership" (1924); all enlightening and important books. His work was inspired by a few, but fundamental, principles. He insisted that it was necessary to have a true conception of the nature of man before any proper theory of life, or any basis of criticism, is possible. It is plain, he thinks, that the philosophy of naturalism and naturalistic humanism have erred because of having a wrong idea of what the constitution of

man is. He maintains that criticism of thought and life must proceed under the guidance of fixed standards, and that these standards emerge from the philosophy which is adopted. Babbitt sees in the philosophies of the ages one constant and dominant issue, which was first distinctly formulated by the Greeks, the issue between *the abiding* and *the changing*. Parmenides argued that we cannot think of the world consistently unless we take it as one continuous, homogeneous, changeless body, without beginning or end in time. He rejected the appearance of variety and change as due to the deception of the senses. This was the beginning of critical systematic thinking about the nature of the world. Zeno's famous and epoch making "paradoxes" were arguments *against* viewing the world as many (the Pythagorean view) and *for* viewing it as one (the Parmenidean view). Plato's philosophy is based on the principle that there can be no certain knowledge of *the changing*, but only of *the abiding;* and this led to the doctrine of absolute Ideas. From that time on to the present day, the constant problem of philosophy has been the problem of the one and the many, the abiding and the changing. Babbitt plants himself in the position that it is the busines of philosophy and the business of criticism to discover what is abiding in thought and life. He sees in naturalism, and especially in romanticism, a philosophy of the changing; and consequently these philosophies have no fixed principles or standards for thinking, judging, or practical life, so that those who were committed to this philosophy of naturalism were borne along by currents of feeling, gusts of passion, and the wild fancies of the imagination driven by unrestrained emotion. This situation leads to Babbitt's psychological analysis of the mental and moral life. Here Babbitt goes back to Plato's distinction between the life of the senses and the life of reason, the life of systematic thought; and his fundamental moral principle is that thought must control sense. This means that the feelings, emotions, impulses, desires, and the imagination need to be controlled

and directed by the morally enlightened will. In short, the fact of control, and the principle of control based upon the dual constitution of man, are the essence of the humanism advocated by Babbitt and More.

In a brilliant survey and analysis, Babbitt showed that the humanism of the Renaissance, and more especially romantic humanism, became deeply infected with the growing naturalism of the period, and as a result the *true conception of man as such was lost.* Human nature was merged in Nature at large, while pantheism merged God in nature also. This gave an all-embracing Monism in which the dual nature of man disappeared. Babbitt labored comprehensively and systematically to restore the dual nature of man to its rightful place in the philosophy of human life. In the first place, he developed the idea (in "Literature and the American College") that a national literature cannot be studied comprehensively apart from its relations to other literatures. This meant for any modern European literature its relation ultimately to Greek and Latin. Thus he was led to search for the underlying ideas and the guiding principles in the whole body of European literature. This was his method of teaching "Comparative Literature." In "The Masters of French Criticism" and in "Rousseau and Romanticism," he concentrated his attention upon the course of naturalism in French philosophy and criticism. He identifies Rousseau as the spokesman of the naturalistic humanism and the extravagant romanticism of the period. Rousseau popularized the view and the contention that man is naturally good, and that all he has to do in order to achieve his best is to express himself freely, without constraint or restraint. He should express his emotions and impulses freely because they are naturally good; and for the same reason he should exercise his imagination freely without any intellectual constraint or direction. It is easy to see to what extravagances this licence to feeling and imagination would lead. This is well illustrated in German philosophy and letters, where man's self is merged in the "Absolute

Ego," and then in turn becomes the expression of this Ego. So we have the right and duty of absolutely free self-expression, and this means supreme egotism. Individual self-assertion is raised to the nth power in national self-assertion, and we are not surprised to find such expressions as "[the German people are] the only people which believe in the spirit, in the infinite, in the divineness of man, the only people worthy of the name, *the* people, the Urvolk," and "The human mind is the highest form of the divine spirit accessible to our understanding; man's consciousness of God is God's selfconsciousness." All this is a virtual denial of God. Again, when it is said that the world is an evolution of the divine, this is equivalent to saying that there is no divine above the world. The course of naturalism of which these thoughts were the outcome was illustrated by the careers of Renan and Taine. Renan fell early under the spell of Herder and the romanticists. He also, under the influence of Berthelot the chemist, became an enthusiastic believer in the future glories of science. He passed through the stages of romanticism and scientific confidence. He was committed to the philosophy of becoming, but he lost faith in the moral tendency of change. This led him to doubt the reality of all values, and in his disillusionment he fancied that nature was a vast field of deception. Without standards and without sense of value, he abandoned himself to the satisfaction of mere curiosity and sensual enjoyment. Such is the outcome of naturalism.

In the case of Taine, we have the pantheism of Spinoza and Hegel combined with the positivism of Comte and Stuart Mill, two strong currents of naturalism. He, likewise, began with the philosophy of becoming. The world was for him a process of change; but when he discovered in this change no moral tendency, he, like Renan, came to doubt the value of all scientific studies of the inevitable flux. Towards the end of his life he wrote:

> I feel more and more that from the practical point of view they will be useless; an enormous and swift current is carrying us away; of what avail is it to write a memoir on its depth and

swiftness? Indeed, of what avail is it for a man to struggle, if there is nothing abiding in him, no permanent self which may re-act against the current of change?

So with Taine, as with Renan, the endless flux of change brought disappointment and confusion, and ended in disillusionment, despair, and pessimism. They might have learned the lesson from Plato, that there can be no stable and systematic knowledge of the changing. If a thing is today or this moment, and tomorrow or the next moment is something different, there can be no knowledge of the same, and knowledge will not stay.

William James and John Dewey are later adventurers in the philosophy of change. James was one of the sanest of all the anti-absolutistic philosophers. He had a marvellous command of language and a mastery of ideas. He was an acute and thoughtful observer, and had a mind generously hospitable to all sorts of views and opinions. But he had a mortal antipathy to absolutism and a distaste for mathematics. So he was driven to the opposite extreme of attempting a radical pluralistic philosophy. He corrected the disjointed mental states of the Associationists by viewing the mind as a stream of consciousness, or stream of thought, in which each thought took from the preceding and gave to the next. So that in reality "The passing thought is itself the thinker." This fairly describes what passes under observation, but it leaves out the fact that the thought is understood to be *my* thought, the thought of *my* mind. It is not quite accurate to say that the James's philosophy was naturalism; but it must be said that pluralism leaves chaos where it found it. In short, "James found naturalistic philosophy bankrupt, and left it so."

John Dewey is a more narrow minded type than James. He began a confirmed absolutist and romanticist under the tutelage of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and then swung to the opposite extreme. He became obstinately set against absolutism in all its forms; and yet he seems to be certain that his Instrumentalism is absolutely true; no one is more arrogant, no one has more self-assurance in

rejecting the testimony of mankind, and the philosophy of the ages, than he. No doubt Professor Dewey has done some good work in logic and psychology; but he expresses himself in such abstract language that it is often difficult to get his concrete meaning. Perhaps one of the most characteristic, and at the same time most significant, of his statements is:

> We find the will, the idea, and the consequences all placed inside of the act, and the act itself placed only within the larger activity of the individual in society. All reference of knowledge to a precedent reality has disappeared.

When, however, we analyze this statement, we find the antecedent reality as the will, and the end in view as the consequences. Thus we have two things which do not change; the will persists, and the end remains the same. The process of reaching the end is various and changing. Such is the course of experience in general and in particular. In rejecting antecedent reality, Dewey's philosophy is a naturalism which is confined to the moment, a philosophy of the many and the changing, a philosophy which, as we have seen, ends in despair and nullity. Change without a permanent is not even change, but an absolute, disconnected many.

Babbitt undertook to analyze, expose, and refute all these various types of naturalism, especially naturalistic humanism. He planted himself on the principle and results of direct observation. He observed the actual operations of the mind and of the moral life. He viewed with critical attention the excesses of uncontrolled emotion and impulse, excesses flagrantly exhibited in history, and obvious to every observant person in everyday life. But he also observed the fact and the importance of moral control. This fact of control led him to see and to emphasize the dual constitution of man. The natural self with its impressions, emotions, impulses, inordinate desires and passions, wild imagination, and extravagant sentiments, is prone to free indulgence and to excesses in every direction, a changing mass of conflicting and insubordinate interests. One emotion or im-

pulse may overpower another, but in this case there is no exercise of control in the proper sense of the word. Control properly speaking is the exercise of a higher power; it involves foresight and prudence. In other words, it involves an end in view and a measure of value. It is the function of the imagination to present the end in view, and the function of the rational mind to perceive the relation between the present state of feeling and the remote state of satisfaction. The power of the mind to become aware of a state remote from the present and one to be desired, is what Babbitt calls "the higher imagination;" and the resolve to pursue this desired state he calls "the higher will." The higher imagination and the higher will are functions of man's higher nature, and we can observe them in actual operation. The higher imagination sets before him the standards by which to judge the affections and the pursuits of the lower nature. These standards are derived from observing the abiding in the changing. Our lives are immersed in a flux of change; man's experience is a flow of changing states—changing attitudes, changing feelings, changing ideas, changing moods; but nevertheless we do observe what is abiding. The clouds change, but the sky is still there; the shades of the landscape change, but the "everlasting hills" remain. It is true that the mountains come and go, but the earth persists, and the sun continues to rise and set. In these instances we have something that abides through a flux of change, but in none of these cases is there anything which is absolutely permanent; even the pyramids change and in the course of time will disappear. Permanence and change are indissolubly connected; for it is only the permanent that does change. To our observation one or the other may be more manifest. It may be a mystery how our sensations of color, sound, odor, taste, combine with touch to give us the concrete object, the apple, the table, the house we live in, etc.; but the object abides through various experiences. The psychologists tell us of "fixed ideas," and we all know of the "absolute ideas" of Plato's philosophy; but we need only

to observe the steadiness with which our own ideas persist in everyday life, to find instances of what abides through change. A boy forms the idea of being a great scholar, and pursues this idea throughout all the vicissitudes of a long life. This steady pursuit of an idea involves a firm and unchanging will. We all know how stubbornly the human will may resist change. This persistence of idea and will grows out of the undeviating pursuit of love for its chosen object. In view of these observations we are safe in maintaining that in spite of all the variations, the multiplicities, and the complexities of life, we may and do have trustworthy standards by which to judge qualities and direct conduct. In oher words, it is in our power to become and to remain moral agents, instead of allowing ourselves to drift aimlessly with the changing currents of natural feeling, passion, and interest. It is Babbitt's contention that by virtue of the dual constitution of man we may build upon such observation a philosophy which will give us standards, and these standards will rest upon the abiding features of our experience. With this philosophy of the permanent he enters upon an elaborate and most impressive historical criticism of naturalistic waywardness and self-destruction. He traces naturalism to its source in the philosophy of change, a philosophy which goes back to Heraclitus, and which views the world as a constant flux, aimless and endless, and views human life as moment of this change. In this monistic philosophy, God, Man, and Nature are merged in one all-comprehensive course of change. Whatever the shortcomings of this philosophy, none is more obviously and directly fatal than the monistic conception of man. For it, the moral essence of man is the goodness of his primal nature. It is this fundamental assumption and principle that leads to all the excesses and disasters so conspicuously exhibited in the wide field of history and in private life. In exact contrast with this, the dualistic philosophy gives us the prospect of control and direction in accordance with standards and principles grounded in the experienced permanence of some aspects of the nature of things. Babbitt has made the modern age

his debtor by the clearness and force with which he has presented this issue, and by the enlightened criticism which his principles have enabled him to carry out.

We must forego the engaging task of sketching the important work of Baron Ernest Seillière, an account of which is given in the fourth chapter under the title "The Rational Imperialism of Ernest Seillière and American Humanism; A Comparison." Seillière, a man of high birth and independent fortune, was educated in science at *l'Ecole Polytechnique,* and in philosophy at Heidelberg. He had the disposition and the leisure to devote himself uninterruptedly to literary activity. A glance at the titles of some of his fifty books, not to mention hundreds of magazine articles, covering the period from 1897 to 1932, shows that he was fully committed to the principle that the literature and life of the period are grounded in and directed by the dominant philosophy. He saw the naturalistic drift and its culmination in romanticism. He analyzed the motives, and found the will to live and to prosper primordial. But this more fully developed is the lust of power, the dominant passion of the Middle Ages; and in the nation it takes the form of "Imperialism." When this imperialism identifies itself with God's will, it becomes what Seillière calls "Mystical imperialism," which has led to so much national strife and disaster. It should be pointed out that one interesting and significant feature of Seillière's work is his treatment of Mysticism, which he analyzes and classifies under the heads of "passional," "æsthetic," "social," and "racial,"—all forms of naturalistic mysticism, even when associated with the idea of God. Seillière follows in the main the same line of criticism that we have found so exhaustively exhibited in Babbitt. They both emphasize the principle of control, but they differ as to the organ which exercises this control; with the former it is reason, with the latter it is the higher imagination and the higher will. The question arises whether these organs are really effective without the aid of religion. It is obvious that the dualistic view of man's nature lends itself to the claims of religion, but the monistic view does not. We must now seek to determine

just how far religion may be actually involved in the dualistic view championed by More and Babbitt. This question is considered in chapters V and VI, headed respectively "Neo-scholasticism and the Tradition of Dualism," and "The Relation of Dualistic Humanism to Religion."

Dualism has "an oriental as well as an occidental tradition;" it goes back to Buddha and Confucius on the one hand and to Plato on the other. This is to be expected, for common sense recognizes the distinction between the natural appetites and the commanding intellect or reason. Plato was the first to mark off distinctly the sense-world in opposition to the thought-world. Christianity inherited and adopted this view. Scholasticism, especially Neo-scholasticism, revives and attempts to perpetuate this dualistic tradition. In Greek thought, the dualistic view of man involved metaphysical dualism, which centered in the problem of the One and the Many. Here the senses give us the world of the many; the intellect grasps the existence of the One. When the intellect recognizes the abiding elements of experience, the universal in particular, it gives us standards by which to judge the activities of sense, imagination, and desire. The universal standards are the true, the good, and the beautiful; these are the universal constants by which we judge truth, goodness, and beauty in particular cases. According to Scholasticism it is the function of the intellect to furnish these standards. So the intellect is the link between man and God. The argument is "An activity in man capable of reaching the abiding must have its source in the abiding." "Let us make man in our image." We cannot delay on the details of this discussion, but may point to a loose use of the language of psychology. The author, for example, speaks of the sensations of the body in a way to imply that the body itself has sensations. Such language may serve the use of ordinary discourse; but in strictness sensations are conscious states, states of the mind, not of the body. There are other evidences of metaphysical shortcomings, but they do not affect the general course of the argument.

In passing to the treatment of humanism and religion,

we note that Babbitt confines himself strictly to the consideration of man as such, and deliberately excludes the introduction of religion. And he does this on the grounds that he is writing for the non-religious and the skeptic, not for the religious. He professes to be positive and critical, and to base his treatment on direct observation of the immediate data of experience. In this way he proposes to meet naturalistic philosophy on its own ground. He observes the higher imagination and the higher will co-operating in the exercise of control. In the light of this principle he pursues the criticisms of naturalistic humanism. He shows that this philosophy, based on the uncritical assumption that man is naturally good, has led to excess and disaster. The fact of control is a matter of common experience, and we may observe various instances and various degrees of control. So we may observe various degrees of imagination and will; and there seems to be little objection to the use of the terms "higher imagination" and "higher will," but we may venture the critical reflection that the status of these functions seems to be ambiguous. The functions either belong to the natural man or they are supernatural. If they are supernatural, then either man is supernatural, or they do not belong to his nature. We have a tradition and a doctrine that man is a spiritual being; but here again the word "spiritual" as well as the contrasting word "natural" is ambiguous. The natural may include the body and the sense activities, together with the sensuous imagination; on the other hand the spiritual may include all that is not material. The Scholastics seem to have held that the intellect is a function of the natural man. These ambiguities infect the philosophy of dualism as applied to the constitution of man, and consequently leave Babbitt's doctrine questionable. But these considerations aside, a serious practical question is whether the "higher will" is capable of effective control. Here Babbitt, although stoutly maintaining that his higher will secures the needed control, is ready to accept the aid of religion. In other words, he is not averse to the suggestion that this higher will may be strengthened and made adequate by the Divine Will. This at least is

Professor Mercier's suggestion; and this is the point at which Humanism and religion are connected.

The further treatment of the relation of humanism to religion leads us to the consideration of the contribution which Paul Elmer More adds. This is given in chapter VII, "Humanistic Dualism and Christianity." Babbitt undertook to define and expound a humanism free from the complications of Renaissance humanism, complications with religious tradition, and also with the naturalism of the scientific revolution; on the other hand a humanism distinct from and directly opposed to the humanism of the Rousseauists and the romanticists, based upon the natural and essential goodness of man. He deliberately and systematically excludes religious references and inferences, although he is not interested to deny the connection between his type of humanism and religion. He plants himself on the observed fact that control is exercised over the natural man by the agency of the higher imagination and the higher will. This higher will may ultimately involve the Divine Will, but Babbitt chooses not to consider this connection. It is just at this point that More takes up the discussion, and pursues it seriously and elaborately. Paul Elmer More is a scholar of distinction. His studies in Greek tradition, especially in Plato, and his studies in Church history, have won for him a leading position among historians in these fields. He, like Babbitt, made himself acquainted with the philosophy of the Upanishads and Indian literature. As Professor at Princeton and afterwards as editor of the New York Nation he distinguished himself as an influential teacher. He buried himself for a time in Shelburne, N. H., to produce the "Shelburne Essays," in which he laid the foundation for his critical work in Platonism and in early Christian history. He found, or at least he emphasized the fact, that Christian philosophy rested upon, or grew out of, Plato, especially Plato's dualism, his distinction once for all between the world for sense and the world for thought, the world of sensations and the world of ideas. We cannot pause to skech the author's summary exposi-

tion of More's philosophy. We may remark, however, that More, as did Augustine and Descartes before him, adopts the skeptical attitude and method with a view to showing that scepticism leads, when critically developed, to both sound philosophy and true religion. It is fundamental with More, as it is with Babbitt, to challenge Monism, and to contrast its shortcomings with the logical completeness of Dualism. It seems, however, that at this point neither Babbitt nor More has proceeded with adequate metaphysics. It is a long and complicated story, but Plato was a monist in so far as he made the idea of the Good supreme. Christianity is monistic in its doctrine of creation. Plotinus was monistic in his doctrine that all things proceed from the One. It seems to be due to a misapprehension that Plotinus is said to have perverted Plato's doctrine. Both Plato and Plotinus were ethical dualists, as is, of course, Christianity. But ethical dualism is not inconsistent with metaphysical monism. The metaphysical dualists were those who made good and evil absolute and antigonistic entities. The issue between monism and dualism cannot be disposed of in summary fashion. The philosophy of Love is monistic, dualistic, and trinalistic according to the mode of interpretation. Swedenborg says: "Love and wisdom are not two things but one, and Love is that one." Here we have an absolute monism, which asserts that wisdom is a function of Love. He also says that love and wisdom are substance and form; this is a metaphysical dualism, which goes back to Aristotle. Furthermore, he says that there are three things in the Lord which are the Lord, viz., Love, Wisdom, and Use; this is a metaphysical and theological trinalism. Certainly no one was ever a more insistent and consistent ethical dualist than Swedenborg; but, as might be shown, his monism is not contradictory of his dualism nor of his trinalism. Both his dualism and his trinalism are derivatives; they are inherent in the nature of Love. Both materialistic and idealistic monism as contrasting and exclusive are, no doubt, at fault; but this is because each is a one-sided type of monism. It seems, therefore, that the arguments against monism and for dualism

are equally questionable. The approach to religion from Platonism is well grounded in so far as the distinction between the world for sense and the world for thought (the world of ideas) is involved. But it must be said that, strictly speaking, neither Plato nor Aristotle has an idea of God, though it is true that they use the word God *(Theós)* and gods *(theoî)*, then meaning a finite God or else a form of metaphysical reality, as the Good, or Wisdom. Again, it seems that the rationalistic approach to religion is unduly discredited. The fact that all attempts to disparage the intellect are made by the intellect wears too much the appearance of self-contradiction, and would seem to invalidate such attempts. Much has been made of perception, or intuition, as a function which exceeds or supplements reason. This is to a certain degree justifiable, for the terms must be perceived before their relations can be seen, and it is distinctly the business of the rational faculty to perceive relations. The intellect is the function which selects among terms and fixes their relations. But the problem of terms and relations, as at least every reader of F. H. Bradley knows, is one of the most obstinate problems of metaphysics, or, perhaps we should say, problems of dialectics. Whatever the validity or importance of these critical observations, we have before us the relation of humanism to religion. For Babbitt and More the transition from humanism to religion is through the relation of the "Higher will" to the Divine Will. The danger here is that if we identify the higher will with the Divine Will, the next step, as is apt to be the case in mysticism, is to identify the Divine with an inferred object, and is subject to the limitations and uncertainties of inference. We are not always sure whether we are dealing with the author's own philosophy or with that of Babbitt and More; but we may assume, except where the contrary is evident, that we have before us the author's exposition of their philosophies. This transition from the higher will to the Divine Will is a case in point, as in the phrase "the higher will ultimately the Divine Will." But the attempt to pass from humanism to religion on the basis of Platonism is certainly More's procedure. If we

identify the life of the senses with the natural man, and the world of ideas with the spiritual, then we have the formula for passing from the natural to the spiritual. But the question arises, are we taking the word "spiritual" in the metaphysical or in the religious sense. There are few words which are used more ambiguously and more vaguely than the word "spiritual." For the most part the word is used for contrast to what is material or natural; what is not material or natural is spiritual, and this for materialism or naturalism is just nothing. We must, however, leave the pursuit of this distinction between the natural and the spiritual to another occasion. Whether or not More was right in identifying Plato's world of ideas with the spiritual, he was no doubt on the right track when he made use of what Plato says about "participation" and "imitation" to render intelligible, as far as possible, the fact of the Incarnation. But aside from this, his arguments in favor of the Incarnation are very impressive, and hold good for any rational treatment of the subject. He is also distinctly helpful in connecting the Resurrection with the Incarnation to show the reasonableness of the former. We must omit any discussion of his work in this field, but his work in the early history of the Christian Church is too important to pass over lightly. His "Christ the Word" was a signal contribution to Church history up to the Council of Chalcedon (451). He accepts and defends the declaration that Jesus Christ "was a person who embraced within Himself the full nature of divinity and the full nature of humanity," and this meant "a direct attack on the whole modernist movement," and he wrote that "the whole bent of higher criticism during the last hundred years has been directed against the Definition of Chalcedon" (the above declaration). The Incarnation is a miracle,—the same in kind as, though greater in degree than, the miracle of raising the arm under the action of the will. The author concludes this chapter with an argument for an infallibly authoritative Church; the alternative is endless theological disputes. In view of the mysteries of religion, and especially of the Christian religion, the need of an authoritative

Revelation is obvious. The modern temper has no objection to the authority of Science, but it abhors authority in religion. In any case the principle of authority does not escape the requirement of reasonableness; we accept authority for good reasons. The limitations of our knowledge leave open the field of free choice.

The final chapter sums up the issue between humanism and naturalism. It is recognized that humanism is a constant feature of human thought and life; and we may add that naturalism is also. The humanism which adopts the principle of control is directly opposed to the humanism which assumes that man is essentially and naturally good. Humanism of the former type is also directly opposed to naturalism, which is the outcome of the view that Nature is all there is, and that all things are from Nature.

The book as a whole contains much sound philosophy and many helpful statements. It is successful in maintaining that Naturalism, as anti-religious, leads to disaster in the life of both the individual and the community. It is another witness to the fact that Protestantism is yielding to the forces of Naturalism, and as a form of the Christian religion is fast disappearing. Furthermore the book shows that the fate of Christian civilization is involved. But when we ask, what remedy does it provide, it has only humanism or the Catholic Church to offer. The principles of humanism as set forth by Babbitt and More would no doubt afford some help; the Catholic Church would also do something to mitigate disastrous tendencies. But, as is obvious, the world has come to this pass under the ægis of the Catholic Church, and unless it acquires new principles nothing more can be expected of it. Are there any new principles to be had?

The answer to this question has been known to the world, or at least to a part of it, for more than a century and a half. These principles are:

1. The Bible proper has a distinct and continuous spiritual sense.

2. The Lord has made His promised Second Coming through the opening of this spiritual sense.

3. This spiritual sense teaches that the Lord Jesus Christ was the Divine Love of saving men, and this Love glorified His Humanity, making it one with the infinite Love, the Love of the whole created universe, so that, as the glorified Humanity, He had all power in heaven and on earth.

4. This spiritual sense also teaches that man is essentially a spiritual being, clothed in this world temporarily with a material body, but living timelessly in the spiritual world.

5. It also teaches that man lives constantly and momentarily from the Lord, and that he does this on the higher planes of his being by learning and obeying the laws of his life as given in the letter and spirit of the Word.

6. The body of doctrine contained in Swedenborg's Writings is drawn from the letter and spirit of the Word under the Lord's guidance and enlightenment.

In learning and applying these principles and doctrines man has a new access to the help and life which the Lord gives him. On the basis of these principles and doctrines we have a new philosophy, the philosophy of Love. According to this philosophy, man is a form of love, constituted by Divine Love, and recipient in its degree of the Divine Love. When this Love is received, according to its intent it is unselfish love, when it is perverted it is self-love. These two are the primary loves of man. We have the law of love in the statement, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Naturalism is the systematic expression of self-love. Humanism in all its types is naturalism, with the single qualification that, when the principle of control is adopted and applied, the way may be opened to religion. Religion requires the complete subordination of self-love to the love of the neighbor. When this is done the evils and difficulties of life gradually disappear. This is called the new birth, regeneration, which is brought about by the power of the Lord's Love as we receive it and express it. As this Love makes the individual man new, it will make the world of mankind new.

LEWIS F. HITE.

"THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES AND THE INDUSTRIAL CRISIS."

AMONG the ten books of 1933 pronounced most useful to them by a large number of thoughtful ministers was Rev. Edmund B. Chaffee's "The Protestant Churches and the Industrial Crisis."* By the paper jacket on each copy the publishers inform us that Dr. Chaffee graduated from the University of Michigan in 1909, from the Law School of that institution in 1913, and from Union Theological Seminary in 1916; and that after war service as Captain of the American Red Cross in Palestine, he was called in 1920 to be director of the Labor Temple on the East Side of New York City, where an open forum is maintained for the free discussion of everything interesting to the laboring classes, and has served in that capacity ever since. They further inform us of the author's purpose in writing the book, as follows:

> Since the days of Walter Rauschenbusch there have been increasing numbers of churchmen who have believed that the Christian message was a message of social redemption fully as much as personal regeneration. But this view was decidedly that of a minority in our Christian churches. Now the world-wide economic stagnation and the bitter suffering accompanying it have aroused and frightened millions. *The social gospel is no longer academic but vital and personal. What that gospel is, and precisely what the churches can and ought to do towards social reconstruction, is the theme of this book.* The writer believes that the Protestant churches have the most magnificent opportunity in their history, but that *failure to grasp it may result in unprecedented social catastrophe.* (No italics in original.—Ed.)

Rev. Dr. Henry Sloan Coffin, President of Union Theological Seminary, has contributed a Foreword to the vol-

**The Protestant Churches and the Industrial Crisis.* By EDMUND B. CHAFFEE, B.D., J.D. New York: Macmillan Co. 1933. xvi, 243 pp., 12 mo. $2.00.

ume; and in it we find him sounding a similar ominous note, as follows:

> Catastrophe awaits our American Protestant Christianity if we in this day are blind to the perils in our economic and industrial life. (P. viii.)

Harper's Magazine for February has given publicity to similar forebodings in an article by the Rev. David C. Colony, entitled "God Save the Church!" in which we find the author expressing the following opinion:

> Unless the Church becomes militant against injustice and greed, it will not be long before the Church in America goes the way of Russian Orthodoxy. . . . The present economic order, like the house of the Tzars of Russia, is bound to go under. And with the passing of that order, there is danger that religion will go the way of the Russian Orthodox Church. (Pp. 251, 252.)

When writing these sentences, Mr. Colony apparently had in mind the possibility of an enormously destructive revolution in this country; but much of his study stresses the generally unchristian character of ministers and laity in the Christian churches of the land. Bishop Noah W. Williams of the African Methodist Church recently expressed a similar opinion when he said: "I have come to the conclusion that the dominant pulpit of America, both Catholic and Protestant, either does not know the content of the gospel of Jesus Christ or is too timid or selfish to preach it" (see *The Christian Century,* March 21, 1934, p. 402). All this should remind us of the story entitled "Rejected of Men" by our own Howard Pyle, wherein by a Christ-like figure in our own day and nation, he depicted his own New-Church opinion of the ecclesiastical Christianity of our United States of America. A Christianity that would reject Christ in person would stand condemned by an unbiased judgment of the mass of the people, and might well be brushed aside during any period of reconstruction.

The chapter headings of Dr. Chaffee's book will indicate the main subjects considered by him. They run as follows:

1. What Has Religion to Do with Economics? 2. Jesus and the

Industrial Crisis. 3. Unemployment—Crime and Menace. 4. The Economic Roots of War. 5. The Drag of the Profit Motive. 6. Slavery and the Rise of Social Classes. 7. The Role of Machinery in the Present Crisis. 8. Karl Marx and American Radicalism. 9. The Duty of the Church in the Industrial Crisis. 10. What One Church Is Doing—Labor Temple. 11. The Responsibility of the Individual Christian. 12. The Technique of Preaching the Social Gospel. Conclusion.

Except superficially Dr. Chaffee does not analyze the causes of the present distressed condition of our country; but he does stress in this connection the development of machine technique and the enormous increase in mechanical energy, now benefitting especially the owning class, but fraught with glorious possibilities for the future earthly happiness and spiritual well-being of the race, if directed for the benefit of all humanity. As a result of that development and of the accompanying concentration of ownership, he frequently calls attention to the ominousness of mass unemployment, and the necessity of solving that problem. He doubtless would have agreed with Mr. Olney Redmond's prediction in this matter, to which I called attention two years ago (*New-Church Review,* April, 1932), as thus expressed:

> The nation is at war with unemployment. . . . The government must settle this problem of unemployment, or unemployment will settle the government.

The overthrow of our government here hinted at might be either from revolutionary uprising or from capitalistic repression. Many believe that the stage is already set for fascist control of our nation.

Facing this problem of unemployment Dr. Chaffee expresses his belief that

> There can be no permanent solution of our unemployment problem and the other economic ills which have come upon us until we make some basic and sweeping changes. . . . An increasing number of our church leaders, especially our younger ministers, are demanding that our present capitalistic structure be abolished and a new system built to take its place. (P. 62.)

Dr. Chaffee's book was written before the present administration came into power. Were he writing today, there can be no doubt that he would express himself as having no faith in the "recovery" that our government is attempting. In this connection it may be well at this time to consider what certain of our forward-looking weekly periodicals are saying as to the condition of the nation at the end of the first year of the Rooseveltian régime. I will quote briefly from estimates by *The Nation, The New Republic, The World Tomorrow,* and the *New Masses.*

In its issue of March 7th *The Nation* says (p. 262):

> In spite of some improvement in business and a very few million men back at work, the chance of the serious, thoroughgoing revival of activity which is necessary to bring about a state of health in the economic system still seems remote. The reason is not far to seek. The capitalist system is not going to be saved if it can possibly help it. It seems determined, with a sort of idiotic cunning, to prevent Mr. Roosevelt from forcing it to do what is necessary for its survival. This statement is sweeping and therefore unjust to some individual intelligent business men. But it is not unjust to many of the largest, most powerful businesses in the country. . . . The result of this almost concerted effort to thwart the President's intention has been dramatic. Perhaps 3,000,000 people have gone back to work in industry, with about 4,000,000 employed in relief or other government jobs; and more than 10,000,000 are still unemployed.

In its issue of March 14th *The New Republic* says (p. 116):

> It is perfectly clear . . . that all these efforts will come to nothing unless the whole administration, from the President down, is determined to battle to the death with the great industrialists who, for their part, will leave nothing undone to keep their workers in their present condition of virtual slavery. We see no evidence that the administration is ready for such a struggle. On the contrary, we see a number of its most important posts held by men who share the views of these industrialists.
>
> When we turn to the position of consumers as a whole, the record is equally dark. The document which the Consumers' Advisory Board has at last made public, after bringing the greatest possible pressure to bear on General Johnson, is a most impressive and completely damning presentation. The Board shows that the N. R. A.

has sold the country to big business for a mess of pottage. . . . The Board declares that when the profiteering now reflected in wholesale prices is extended to retail prices during the next few months, the most serious consequences may be expected. . . . If our analysis of his [the President's] intentions is correct, both he and the public are in for a painful awakening.

In its fortnightly issue of March 15th *The World Tomorrow* says (p. 124):

The greater part of our tentative prosperity is due to government spending on an unbalanced budget. A ten-billion-dollar deficit is possible for one year, but hardly feasible for a second year, and quite impossible for a third year. What then, if prosperity has not returned? . . . All in all the Presidential program is admirably calculated to please a politically confused and inept nation which knows that its joy ride is over but does not know exactly where it is going. . . . Meanwhile, this is no time to lag for those who are working for a new society.

In its issue of March 6th *New Masses,* which speaks of itself as "America's first revolutionary magazine," says (p. 12):

Since interest is paid from surplus value, and surplus value is created only by the exploitation of workers,—the combination of tremendous centralization of capital, and the mountainous debt structure foreshadow attempts to institute robbery of the working class on a scale hitherto unheard of, and of which N. R. A., with its lifting of the anti-trust and combination laws, its systematic organization of the employers wherever such organization is necessary, and its starvation wage codes, represent only a first step . . . The most dangerous illusion extant among workers is that N. R. A. was designed to aid them. . . . The total income of the working class has been reduced by some 60 to 70 percent since 1929. We cannot read the unemployed out of the working class.

These statements were hardly off the press before our government officials announced that of the four million persons on the government C.W.A. employment roll, two million and a half would be dropped by the end of March. This meant that that number would be thrown back upon the wholly inadequate resources of the various States and local communities. Of course, the unemployment here under review is that of persons who were for the most part definitely among the regularly employed previous to 1930. But we

should not be unmindful of the sorry lot of the swelling host of recent graduates from all our institutions of learning who constitute a multitude of "the never-yet employed," a multitude annually increased by quotas of several hundred thousand ambitious youths practically without opportunity to make a start in life, and fated by present conditions to be for an indefinite time among the compulsorily idle.

We are in the fifth year of the depression. Our government has done nothing fundamentally effective to solve the problem of unemployment. Were present conditions like those in Egypt at the time of the seven years famine when Joseph ruled on behalf of the Pharaohs, we might well expect a similar concentration of ownership and similar universal slavery by the end of 1936. But the conditions are far from being the same. However that may be, there are some persons who assert that a secret coterie of Joseph's race is even now guiding the destinies of this nation for an outcome similar to that in ancient Egypt. But with tens of thousands of well-educated men and hundreds of thousands of ambitious youths among the millions of the unemployed, peaceful submission to dispossession of all property rights and to deprivation of all honest means of subsistence will not continue a great while longer. Evidently the conditions are ripening not only for increasing lawlessness and violence but also perhaps for bloody attempts at fundamental revolution.

I have been speaking of the menace of unemployment, but there are other ominous forebodings not only for the unemployed but also for those who have work. As a thing that may come to affect all the middle and lower classes (as to financial resources) who are now employed, we should not forget the possibility of paper inflation of our currency, which some authorities have predicted as inevitably coming. Gold is no longer the basis of our money; in fact the permanent worth of the notes we are now using is very problematical. The Bonus Bill on behalf of our Veterans has been passed by Congress over the President's

veto, and has perhaps made conditions ripe for paper inflation, if the powers that be so decide. Those who have studied the effect of such inflation in other countries predict that, if such inflation comes, the impoverishment of practically everybody except the privileged rich will inevitably result. Another threatening cloud that many see on the horizon of the present time is that of impending war. This is a very real danger which we as individuals are quite impotent to prevent. But in our present discussion we must omit both these possibilities from further consideration.

All this is more or less in harmony with the following statement by Dr. Chaffee:

> No sane man can now question that we are facing a crisis of the first order. We are headed for a catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude. (P. 168.)

He follows this ominous statement with the words:

> With over half of our population members of our churches, it is of importance to ask what the church can do in the emergency upon us. What is the responsibility of organized religion?

Before considering Dr. Chaffee's answer to that question, let us see whether the Protestant Churches as a whole, as represented at the meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, in Washington, D. C., last December, had anything vital to say on the subject. The general theme of that meeting was "Advancing with Christ," and the economic crisis came in for some careful general consideration. As one result of that consideration the heads of the national organizations present prepared a statement entitled "The Present Crisis as a Summons to Spiritual Advance," the most pertinent paragraph of which for our consideration reads as follows:

> We are agreed that our emphasis on spiritual values calls for a rebuilding of our economic life. Private profit as the cornerstone of the economic order appeals to men to be selfish when the Christian Gospel bids them be unselfish and seek the common good. We plead, therefore, for a courageous facing of the cause and cure of our present situation in terms of the Christian principle that the

aim of any economic system should be the welfare of the people. While the churches should stand above any political or economic partisanship, they cannot be indifferent to the central issue as to whether our economic order is to have a Christian or an unchristian basis. (Federal Council Bulletin, February, 1934, p. 7.)

That is good as far as it goes; but it is a plea and nothing more,—only a first step. It was not followed by any attempt to get at causes other than those that are implicit in universal selfishness. Indeed it is probable that very few persons present at that meeting had any adequate awareness of some of the causes that must be seen before the campaign for permanent and fundamental reform can be rightfully directed. In view of the fact that the greater part of the wealth of the nation is held by individuals who are the dominating element in the churches, and the fact that all church funds of a "permanent" character derive their resources from capitalistic institutions, it is practically certain that, if "capitalism" is doomed, all organized church bodies will be for a time on the losing side of the contest. This is one reason for some of the remarks in Dr. Chaffee's book with regard to the possibility of the brushing aside of the Christian churches by revolutionary forces in the developments of the not distant future.

If there is any likelihood of such a happening to the organized churches, that possibility does not mean that real Christianity as exemplified in the lives of truly earnest Christians is in danger of extinction. But by way of admonition to such persons as component parts of organized churches Dr. Chaffee says:

> Next to the duty of love, there is no more important task laid upon the individual Christian today than that of understanding this era, of grasping the significance of this moment in human history. We are literally at the end of an epoch. For the last few decades one of the greatest changes in all human history has been taking place. Unless that fact is known and appreciated, the Christian has not even begun the task events are laying upon him today. (P. 208.)

In harmony with this statement is the following:

One of the greatest contributions which our churches can make to the solving of the present industrial problem is to help people to understand it. (P. 172.)

That is where the Christian minister, apart from his function in conducting services purely for worship, comes in. He must live and preach the social gospel, if he would help the impending transformation to a happy outcome. And, as Dr. Chaffee says:

All this will mean heroism, struggle and sacrifice on the part of the prophets who have the vision. Moreover it will mean that they work quickly, for even now there are signs that our western world will slip over the abyss, and the historians of the future will record that the men of the 1930's solved the economic problem on the physical side but had not the courage nor the vision to solve it organizationally. Three roads lie before us. One leads to the progressive breakdown and abandonment of our machine technique, another is the way of dictatorship and regimentation, a third offers economic salvation for the children of men. No one yet knows which it will be, but it will not be the third unless the social gospel of Christ is preached passionately, wisely and quickly. (P. 240.)

In the closing paragraph of his book Dr. Chaffee implies that he is doubtful whether the chance for such economic salvation in the near future through the instrumentality of the churches has any better prospects than one out of ten. That shows how ominous he thinks the present situation is; and there are many who agree with him. In this connection it is worth while noting the sentences with which Dr. Chaffee closes his chapter on "Karl Marx and American Radicalism."

Without some knowledge of Marxism even the terminology, the very words used by our radicals, are unintelligible. With this knowledge it is easy to understand the hostility of many economic radicals to the church and to religion. They are simply following Marx. And let our churches not deceive themselves. A powerful force, probably the most powerful force in our present world, is being pitted against them and the attitude towards life for which they stand. That force is surely forcing our Christian churches to make answer as to where they stand in what our radical friends call "The Class Struggle." And that answer must not be long delayed. (P. 166.)

In this Marxian paragraph, Dr. Chaffee seems to be referring to the communistic movement as the great antagonist of organized Christianity; and everyone knows that there has been a good deal written about the conflict between these forces, and concerning the keenness of the conflict at present, especially in the Asiatic world. Speaking from his personal knowledge of that conflict both in Asia and in America, Rev. Dr. E. Stanley Jones recently uttered among his last words before departing for his mission field in India, the following judgment:

> What attitude should we take towards social reconstruction? Mind you, not social service within the framework of the present system, but *a shifting of the whole of society to a new and more just basis.* We are face to face with that question in both east and west. *We have got to provide an alternative to Marxian communism or succumb to it.* And the only way to beat them is to beat them to it. (*The Christian Century,* March 14th.)

Commenting upon this statement a week later, the Editor of *The Christian Century* ended his remarks with the following sentence:

> It is the fate of religion in both hemispheres that is at stake when Stanley Jones declares that the time has come when missions must move forward beyond the idea of doing social service to dedication to social revolution.

The likelihood of communistic domination in this country seems so remote, however, that it is quite possible that, in his allusion to "a powerful force" in the Marxian paragraph quoted above, Dr. Chaffee was not referring to communism but to that invisible government which some persons believe to be behind our own government and that of every other occidental nation, which is by most persons quite unsuspected, and which claims to hold in its hands the destinies of the civilized peoples of the globe. In this connection the Jew Disraeli said in his book "Coningsby" in 1844:

> The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes.

It is not my purpose to speak here more openly of what

was probably in Disraeli's mind when he made that statement. Personally I believe that there is considerable evidence that such a sinister organization exists, though who the individuals may be who compose it is a mystery. But it is emphatically asserted by some persons that such an organization is the basic cause of the malignant enemic diseases from which all humanity is suffering at the present time, and which is the underlying reason for the communistic agitation not only in Asia but also in America; and they assert that a recognition of that fact will come to any intelligent person who ferrets out the primary causes of the economic maladies of our civilization.

It must be obvious from what has preceded that I have no intention of glossing over the difficulties before this nation in its efforts to attain a condition of equity and peace. Quite the contrary. Bearing in mind the old maxim, "Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst," I would in this instance stress the latter part of this admonition, and would glance forward to envisage, if possible, some of the frightful things that may happen as the ominous conditions of the present give birth to future events, so that we may in some measure anticipate what to prepare for. I am not suggesting how to prepare; but in the interests of the New Church and of the Lord's Kingdom on earth, I would admonish my readers to give their best efforts to the understanding of present conditions from the standpoint of Christian principles, and to make themselves as far as possible instruments in the hands of the Lord to advance His purposes here below in this chaotic wilderness period of His New Church. Evidently my own opinions are largely in harmony with those of Dr. Chaffee. I have quoted liberally from his book so as to set forth his views in his own words; and I have quoted liberally from other sources so as to show that multitudes of thoughtful minds are full of similar apprehensions. Finally I will remark that I have written as I have done because I think it is highly important for New-Church

people individually and collectively to give consideration to these matters.

The preceding consideration of present day conditions has nothing of the New Church in it; but it cannot but be of interest to some New-Churchmen as depicting the faulty civilization in which we are living, and which must be very greatly transformed if the Lord's New Church is ever to appeal to mankind as a whole. It is very evident that the *maximus homo* of heaven is as yet but dimly reflected in the Lord's universal church on earth. Heavenly order can be realized generally in the world only by first eradicating the causes of the multitudinous social ills that have been brought about by the machinations of the forces of evil. No palliative measures dealing merely with results can ever bring real relief. To "hope for the best" is to look forward to conditions that can come about only after "the worst" that we should prepare for has given place to reconstruction on grounds of approximate equity. New-Churchmen must drive their investigations clear to ultimates, and must seek to oust the devil from his secret strongholds, if they are to promote the reformation and regeneration of society. Economic mankind must examine itself, must see its sins against brotherly love, and must repent and turn from those sins, if the Kingdom of God is ever to reign upon earth. Enormous troubles, tragic troubles, are before society. It is the duty of New-Churchmen, individually and collectively, to help in their solution.

B. A. Whittemore.

"REFLECTIONS ON THE END OF AN ERA"*

REINHOLD NIEBUHR is in his forty-second year. He graduated from the Yale Divinity School in 1914, received a degree of A.M. in 1915, and in that year became pastor of Bethel Church in Detroit, which he served until called to teach Applied Christianity in Union Theological Seminary, where he is an inspiring influence in the lives of the embryonic ministers studying there. He is a contributing editor of *The Christian Century* and of *The World Tomorrow*. He is the author of the following thought-provoking books: "Does Civilization Need Religion" (1927); "Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic" (1929); "The Contribution of Religion to Social Work" (1932); "Moral Man and Immoral Society" (1933); and the volume now before us, "Reflections on the End of an Era" (1934). He is a radical of the Christian Socialist type, and is Chairman of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians (157 Montague St., Brooklyn, N. Y.), an organization which on Feb. 26th of this year sent out a communication over his name to those on its mailing-list, stating that

> The Fellowship is planning to undertake several projects in the field of religious radicalism, in addition to its primary function of advising socialist ministers and laymen, and correlating their efforts. . . . Living as we do under the threat of war and fascism, there may be little time left us in which to prepare for a crisis. We must find out now who can be counted upon, and discipline ourselves to meet what lies ahead. . . .

The Principles of this Fellowship are set forth as follows:

> The Fellowship of Socialist Christians are agreed in their conviction that a Christian ethic is most adequately expressed and effectively applied in our society in socialist terms. They believe that the Christian church should recognize the essential conflict between Christianity and the ethics of capitalistic individualism.

**Reflections on the End of an Era.* By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. 302 pp., 12mo. $2.00.

They believe that the evolutionary optimism of current liberal Christianity is unrealistic, and that changes fundamental enough to prevent destructive social upheaval will require a combination of social intelligence and ethical vigor not yet in sight. Remedies for specific abuses are no adequate substitute for the reconstruction of the economic order so that production may be primarily for the use of all, and not for the profit of the privileged. . . .

From the above one can get an idea of what one will find in these "Reflections on the End of an Era." Mr. Niebuhr is a ready talker and a facile writer. He is in constant demand as a speaker before college men. From the number of books that he is pouring out, it is obvious that they must be characterized by superficiality and popularity rather than by profundity. They are interesting and stimulating reading, but not very enlightening. In his opinion, we are beholding "the tragic spectacle of a civilization slowly destroying itself" (p. 47). Man is a religious creature, but he doesn't act that way; that is, but few men are regenerate enough to act from a religious standpoint all the time. Most individuals and practically all associations of men act and react on the strictly natural plane, in observance of the old maxim "Self-preservation is the first law of Nature." When any group has attained a level above mere subsistence, and increasingly so as it has acquired successive levels of privilege above the destitution of the masses, it tends to consider those privileges as essential to the self it seeks to preserve, and in order to maintain them its will-to-live takes on another phase which our author characterizes as the will-to-power. Every man desires to ameliorate his living conditions; every energetic individual tries to extend his possessions and privileges; every energetic class seeks to exalt its social status; every energetic industrial organization aspires to monopolistic control; every energetic nation tends to become imperialistic. But by ignoring the welfare of those at the bottom, these monopolistic and imperialistic tendencies have within them a suicidal element, in that the resulting injustices finally provoke revolutionary upheavals. We are in the midst of such a revolutionary period; the old

capitalism is really done for. "The great centers of finance and industry must be taken out of private hands, if modern civilization is to live" (p. 186).

Perhaps as interesting a chapter as any is that entitled "The Executors of Judgment." The thoughts expressed in it are not altogether consistent, because our author is fond of epigrammatic statements, which at times need more or less modification; moreover he seems to have in mind Macaulay's forecast of internal dissentions in America, which has been much quoted of recent months, and which is reverberated in the following words:

> The judges of history are always barbarians. . . . Perhaps it is a unique feature of modern society that these barbarians should be bred within and not without the gates of civilization. . . . Whatever may be the loss or gain to "eternal" values in this invasion or revolt of the barbarians, their victory is as certain as their revolt is inevitable when the time is ripe. . . . As regards the time which will be required to make the inevitable actual, prophecy is foolish and dangerous. . . . Those who will ultimately rule modern society will therefore suffer many defeats before they finally triumph. . . . Nevertheless the proletarian seems as certain to rule a new civilization as it is that the commercial and industrial owner held the significant power in the social order which is passing.

Mr. Niebuhr's volume is rightly entitled "Reflections on the End of an Era." He is considering the disintegration of the capitalistic system that has prevailed in recent generations. But New-Churchmen should be more interested in meditations at the beginning of this new age. From a naturalistic viewpoint, Edward Bellamy attempted something of the sort in his "Looking Backward," which is having a new period of popularity, and should be read by everybody not already familiar with it. The technocrats of today are reinforcing his predictions. Swedenborg gives us the religious foundation for optimistic faith in an eventually happy outcome of these troublous times. What the world needs as much as anything else at the present time is level-headed leaders with New-Church insight to help it bring to birth the new civilization of the future.

B. A. WHITTEMORE.

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